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Abstract. For the most part of the last century the role of State owned enterprises was probably more 
pronounced, continuous and prolonged in Italy than elsewhere in the West. This was the response to 
the fact that Italian economic growth had long been penalized by structural frailties such as a narrow 
internal market, a shortage of capital, financial weakness and a decline of entrepreneurial initiative. 
Yet,  the  complexity  of  forms  and  organizations  assumed  by  the  State  direct  intervention  in  the 
economy (just to limit our analysis to the central level) reached heights of imagination and ingenuity 
in  Italy  that  were  probably  unknown  abroad:  State  companies,  State  monopolies,    shareholding 
companies,  State  concerns  and  so  on  co-existed  throughout  the  twentieth  century.  This  helps  to 
explaining why we do not yet have a precise and thorough measure of the weight of public enterprise 
on the entire economy, not to say of more specific data concerning their sectorial and/or regional 
distribution. Thus it has not been so far possible to identify precisely - at a micro level - the real 
dimension  of  Italian  public  enterprise,  and  hence  assess  a  phenomenon  whose  actual  magnitude 
remains unknown to us. The aim of our paper is to fill this gap by showing the basic features of the 
dimension, boundaries, structure, governance and location of Italian SOEs.  
Keywords: Italy, State owned enterprise, size and structure, governance, economic history 
JEL classification: N44, L32, G34 
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1. Introduction  
Direct State intervention in the Italian economy goes back to the unification of the Kingdom 
in  1861  to  compensate  for  the  country’s  structural  frailties:  a  narrow  internal  market,  a 
shortage  of  capital,  financial  weakness  and  a  decline  of  entrepreneurial  initiative.  On  the 
whole, these elements have contributed to the emergence of a large state owned enterprise 
(henceforth SOE). Finance represented a sector in dire need of special attention from the 
government  as  Italy  was  suffering  both  from  chronic  instability  and  from  a  shortage  of 
intermediaries.  If  the  founding  of  a  few  German-type  universal  banks  in  the  1890s  had 
provided a partial remedy for the latter, it conversely increased the potential instability of the 
system, which came close to the breaking point in the early 1930s.  
The  original  envisaged  solution  was  the  creation  of  a  special  body  –  Istituto  per  la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI)
1. It was a state owned company which took over all the banks’ 
industrial  securities,  while  the  banks  themselves  came  under  its  control.  In  the  period 
following the Second World War, the Italian government, unlike the governments of other 
defeated powers, not only resisted pressure to divest public properties progressively and to 
encourage a free market ideology, but also gradually enlarged its control over the economy – 
particularly over finance and banking, industrial production and transport - through what was 
to become in short an organised shareholding system. IRI stood out as the main character in 
the story as well as the pillar of the system.  
The second pillar was Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI),
2 the state energy super-holding, 
created  in  1953  on  the  model  of  IRI.  Later  (1962),  these  two  were  joined  by  the  Ente 
Autonomo di Gestione per il Finanziamento dell’Industria Meccanica (EFIM),
3 into which the 
heavy machinery companies controlled by the state were merged. In between these two dates 
(1956), a superior institution to oversee most of Italian SOEs was created: the Ministero delle 
Partecipazioni  Statali
4  (for  an  overview,  see  Barca-Trento  1997,  Amatori  2000,  Toninelli 
2004). Over the years IRI, ENI and EFIM came to control larger and larger sectors of the 
economy to the extent that in Italy public enterprise had almost become a synonym of them. 
Historians  largely  agree  that  the  second  half  of  the  1950s  and  the  1960s  represented  the 
heyday of state intervention in Italy (Posner-Woolf 1967, Cavazza-Graubard 1972; Sapelli et 
al. 1993, Osti 1993, Balconi et al. 1995, Barca-Trento 1997, Amatori-Colli 1999, Amatori 
                                                 
1  IRI  was  created  in  1933.  It  was  conceived  as  a  temporary  institution,  with  the  aim  of  restoring  and  re-
organizing the suffering companies before restoring them to the market. Later (1937), the absence of private 
buyers as well as changes in the international climate (autarky, re-armament) resulted in its transformation into a 
permanent institution. In the post Second World War period, IRI expanded its activity remarkably and played an 
important role in the industrialization of the South of the country. In the 1970s, the IRI group was hit strongly by 
the economic crisis: in the early 1980s, a large re-organization process was started, in 1992, the super-holding 
was transformed into a joint-stock company which, finally, in June 2000, was definitively wound up. 
2 State activity on the energy sector began in 1926 with the establishment of AGIP, which aimed to secure the oil 
supply to the country. AGIP was the original core of ENI, the super-holding envisaged by Enrico Mattei in order 
to rationalize and control the Italian energy market. Together with IRI, it became one of the main agents of 
Italy’s economic policy and growth, as both the state-holdings statutes had social, as well as economic, goals. 
Later,  it  entered  into  other  manufacturing  (chemical  -  especially  fertilizers  –  and  even  textile)  and  service 
(finance  and  wholesale)  sectors.  In  1992,  it  was  transformed  into  a  joint-stock  company,  which  was  to  be 
privatized in a few years. 
3 EFIM was created to operate in the mechanical industry. Following its creation, it was forced to diversify into 
other manufacturing sectors because of rescue operations of private activities. It went into liquidation in 1993. 
4 The Ministry of State Shareholdings primarily had a political function, which was to re-organize, and take 
control of, all state holdings (enti di gestione) - IRI, ENI, and later EGAM (Mining) and EFIM - as well as other 
minor state activities. Thus, it represented the main channel through which politics entered into the management 
of these economic agents.   3 
2000, de Cecco 2000, Petri 2002, Toninelli 2004). This was a period when, both at national 
and at international level, public enterprise could enjoy a favourable cultural, political and 
social  climate,  in  which  state  intervention  in  its  different  forms  –  planning,  anti-cyclical 
policies,  and  support  to  private  enterprises  –  played  an  essential  role  to  secure  a 
Gerschenkron-type  of  convergence  of  the  latecomer  countries  towards  the  first-comers 
(Gerschenkron, 1962; van der Wee 1989, Stiglitz 1989; Toninelli 2000a, 2000b). According 
to some 1970s estimates pertaining to more than seventy countries (not including the US), 
SOEs (excluding city-owned ones) produced on average about 10% of the national wealth and 
contributed approximately 16.5% to the formation of gross capital (Short 1984: 115). 
The 1970s were an important turning point in the history of public enterprise. In the two 
decades  that  followed,  the  poor  performance  of  the  mixed  economies,  followed  by  the 
collapse of the collectivist regimes, overwhelmed the faith in the thaumaturgic capacities of 
the public hand. Scepticism and disappointment gradually replaced the initial hopes, giving 
way to intense political re-shaping of the role of the state, both through the initiative of de-
regulation  and  through  ample  policies  of  de-nationalisation  (Feigenbaum  et  al.  1998; 
Toninelli 2000a; Clifton et al. 2003; Chick-Lanthier 2004). This wave of de-regulation also 
reached Italy: in the early 1990s, the process of privatisation began putting an end to the long 
parabola of public enterprise in the country (Zanetti-Alzona 1998; Affinito-de Cecco-Dringoli 
2000; Barucci-Pierobon 2007). 
An overall appraisal of the whole experience should not be influenced by today’s almost 
generalised distrust in state action (Stiglitz 1989). However, it cannot be ignored that state 
enterprise  is  nowadays  perceived  by  the  public  opinion,  both  in  Italy  and  abroad,  as  a 
lethargic, monolithic organism: an organism which has been increasingly exercising collusive 
practises, both at an inner level – between the management and the workforce – to defend 
their own privileges, and at an exterior level – with regard to political power – in order to be 
protected  from  market  competition.  As  a  consequence,  at  the  end  of  the  last  century,  an 
almost  unanimous  consensus  emerged  towards  the  privatisation  policies,  based  upon  the 
assumption that the main cause of inefficiency was to be explained primarily by the form of 
ownership and not by the form of governance or by the management behaviour of the firm, 
and/or by the market structure and regulation (World Bank 1995; Shleifer 1998; Megginson-
Netter 2001). The process of privatisation is still on-going and certainly has not settled: while 
the technical analysis tends to classify it as a success, especially in the transitional economies 
and in the less developed countries, for other aspects, it seems to have not fully satisfied the 
initial expectations, particularly with regard to the transparency of governance and the quality 
of services (Stiglitz 2002; Birdsall-Nellis 2003; Rodrick 2004; Clifton-Comin-Diaz Fuentes 
2004). 
Finally, the appraisal of the SOEs performance depends either on the valuation criteria linked 
to  proxies  of  static  efficiency  that  estimate  accountable  profits  and  losses,  or  proxies  of 
dynamic  efficiency  that  consider  the  externalities  which  they  generate  in  terms  of  the 
diffusion  of  innovative  capacity  or  of  the  accumulation  of  skills,  and  thus  on  overall 
productivity (Aharoni 2000; Amsden 2001; Millward 2005). In the Italian case, for example, 
the contribution made by the state holdings to the creation of modern management, to the 
formation of human capital, and to the rationalisation of industrial relations after the Second 
World  War,  should  not  be  undervalued.  It  is  sufficient  to  mention  here  the  diffusion  of 
American  managerial  and  organisational  techniques  introduced  by  IRI,  as  well  as  the 
activities of the controlled Istituto Formazione Addestramento Professionale (IFAP) in the 
opening  and  management  of  training  centres  and  in  the  creation  of  specialised  workers, 
technicians or management, or, even further, the precocious job evaluation systems pioneered 
by Finsider (Bertini 1997; Saletnich 1999; Ricciardi 2003) as well as the contributions of   4 
technical innovations and spill-over given by the R&D divisions of Italian SOEs (Giannetti-
Pastorelli 2007). 
Despite the importance of the phenomenon of Italian SOEs, and of the rich historical debate it 
generated, only a limited amount of empirical studies is so far available (Rapporto Saraceno 
1956; Sartori 1957; Posner-Woolf 1967; Arrighetti-Stansfield-Virno1982; Rapporto Marsan 
c. 1992; Bognetti-Spagnolo 1992). Thus, it is quite difficult to identify precisely - at a micro 
level - the real dimension of Italian public enterprise, and hence assess a phenomenon whose 
actual magnitude remains unknown to us. 
The aim of this work is to fill this gap by showing the basic features of Italian SOEs. For this 
reason,  we  have  reconstructed  the  boundaries  of  the  three  main  state  holdings  that  have 
characterised the system of Italian public enterprise over a long period: IRI, ENI and EFIM. 
The outcome is therefore only a rounding down of the SOE’s real size. The originality of our 
approach is essentially due to three elements: i) the time-span, which covers about half a 
century:  five  benchmark  years  are  likely  to  give  quite  a  satisfactory  picture  of  the  entire 
period; ii) the use of a dataset, the Imita.db, which allows us to compare the actual weight of 
the  public  enterprise  versus  the  overall  Italian  enterprise  system;  iii)  the  attempt  to 
reconstruct,  through  the  identification  of  the  structure  of  shareholding,  the  models  of 
governance adopted. 
The work is organised in the following way: after this Introduction, in Section 2 we 
describe the sources and methods utilised. In Section 3 we illustrate the intra group structure 
of the three state holdings analysed as they emerge from the dataset of the Italian joint stock 
companies, then we reconstruct the extension of the Italian public enterprise (section 4), also 
taking  into  account  the  different  forms  of  control  used  (Section  5);  in  section  6  some 
discussion will be devoted to geographical distribution that is, by regions) of Italian SOES. In 
Section 7 some final conclusive considerations will be suggested. 
 
2. Sources and Methods 
In  order  to  provide  a  quantitative  mapping  of  Italian  public  enterprise  we  used  a 
representative  sample  of  Italian  firms,  the  Imita.db  dataset  (Vasta  2006; 
http://imitadb.unisi.it)
5.  In  the  recorded  firms  we  singled  out  the  state-owned  or  state-
controlled enterprises.
6 The information related to SOEs was gathered directly from the IRI 
and ENI archives: it is made of documents used to produce consolidated balance sheets, of the 
various yearbooks published by the two state holdings and of other sources of various kinds 
such as balance sheet accounts, board of directors reports, etc. Other classic records of Italian 
firms were also consulted, such as the Taccuino dell’azionista, the Annuario delle aziende di 
credito e finanziarie, the Calepino dell’azionista and the Annuario R&S. 
The analysis focuses on 5 benchmark years (1936, 1952, 1960, 1972, 1983) of the Imita.db
7. It  
                                                 
5 For a thorough description of this data-set, see Vasta (2006). This source has already been extensively used for 
examining the general characteristics of Italian industry in the 20th century (Giannetti-Vasta 2003, 2005, 2006). 
6 A first quantitative analysis that uses Imita.db by comparing the dynamics of SOE to private firms in service 
sectors can be found in Toninelli-Vasta (2007). 
7  It  was  not  always  possible  to  employ  data  concerning  the  same  year.  Data  from  the  Imita.db  and  those 
regarding IRI refer to 1952, while for ENI, whose first balance sheet was presented on 30 April 1954, we used 
the 1952 data for controlled firms as well as the 1954 ones for shareholdings, adding the ENI holding data both 
to the universe and to the firms of the group. Regarding the last two benchmark years, our data refer to two 
biennials (1971-2 and 1982-3): data on share capital refer to the years 1972 and 1983, while those on assets refer 
to 1971 and 1982.   5 
identifies the shareholders of each individual firm in those years, reconstructing, in particular, 
those relating to state holdings (in other words, the three groups: IRI, ENI and EFIM), those 
held by the (sub-)holdings of each group (financial and/or operating),
8 and those of all the 
other firms of the group.
9 A list of the holdings is offered in Appendix 1. 
Figure 1 shows an example, without any reference to time, of the general structure of the IRI 
group’s shareholding. This model is also valid for the two other state holdings, even though 
they, especially EFIM, had a much simpler group structure. As we have stated, IRI directly 
entered in a few holding companies (financial or not) with a variable holding share, which 
was  always  above  50%;  moreover,  IRI  held  shares  directly  in  other  firms  (X2,  Y2).  In 
addition, the holding companies held shares in many firms (X1, X2, X3, X4) with variable 
percentage: these (X1, X2, X4), in turn, could hold shares (Y1, Y2, Y3) in a chain structure 
which scaled down to a lower level (Z1, Z2, Z3). In some firms, the direct share of IRI was to 
be added to that of the holding company (X2), while, in some cases, the share structure was 
more complex and could involve up to 10 other subjects. 
<Figure1> 
The sources analyzed have enabled us to reconstruct most of the shares of the three state 
holdings, of their sub-holdings (financial or not), as well as of the most important firms at the 
lower levels (X1, X2, X3, X4). Even though the mapping takes a good part of our sample into 
account, it was not possible to reconstruct further levels of the control chain (Z1, Z2, Z3). 
Thus, the resulting map under-estimates the boundaries of Italian SOEs. The analysis was 
developed following the recent literature on corporate finance and corporate ownership (La 
Porta-Lopez-de-Silanes-Shleifer-Vishny  1999;  for  a  survey,  see  Morck-Wolfenzon-Yeung 
2005). It makes it possible to assess the different estimates of the degree and the size of 
control of the various groups according to two measurements: share capital and assets. In 
particular, it was decided to adopt four different criteria; i) accounting; ii) effective control; 
iii) majority control; iv) pyramidal control. We will now go into more detail, and describe the 
logic which inspired these criteria. 
The accounting criterion attributes to the groups the size of control that emerges from an 
algebraic calculation of the capital shares. For example, in Figure 5.1, the group is granted 
control of 100% of X4 share capital, while, for the X2 firm, we have summed the percentage 
controlled directly by  IRI (40%) to IRI’s control share of the financial company (50.1%) 
times the financial holding company’s controlling share (60%) of the X2 firm. The percentage 
of control attributed to the group reaches therefore a total of 70.06% (40% + 60% * 50.1%). 
                                                 
8 In order to identify the shareholding structure of the various groups we have defined holding companies in a 
more rigorous way than that adopted in the three state holdings documents, as these reflect their internal routines. 
In particular, a holding company has been identified as a firm i) in which one of the three state holdings has a 
shareholding that is higher than 50%, and ii) which controls at least one other company by a percentage greater 
than 50%. The sector of activity of a firm allows us, moreover, to follow the terminology adopted, for example, 
at  the  IRI  Archive  and  to  distinguish  between  financial  holding  companies  -  which  own  and  manage  (or 
administer) other companies - and operating holding companies (not financial). The first ones pertain to Section 
J of the 2001 Ateco-Istat classification (now corresponding to section K of the Eurostat NACE classification of 
economic  activities,),  that  is  Financial  and  insurance  activities.  Such  a  definition,  which  may  appear  quite 
restrictive, guarantees that the firms that are to be referred to as holding companies are only those firms where 
state holdings were able to maintain the control of forward firms without direct shareholding. 
9 Therefore we consider group firms  not only those companies that are defined as such in various state holdings’ 
documents, but all those firms with stakes controlled  by the state holding, by a holding company (financial or 
not), by  another firm of the group or by  any combination of them..   6 
This is the main criterion employed in this first section and represents the benchmark to 
which  the  other  estimates  will  be  compared.  Such  a  criterion  offers  a  quantitative 
reconstruction of the share of each holder, which is the level of ownership of the diverse 
public groups, although it does not guarantee a realistic analysis of the level of state control of 
the Italian enterprise system. For this reason, we have searched for other criteria, diverging 
from a strictly accountable evaluation and thus broadening the quantitative approach. 
The second criterion deals with the effective (actual) control: it attributes to the group the 
entire capital of a firm that is controlled at a level above 20%, while the capital of a firm that 
is controlled by a percentage of less than 20% is not considered. In other words, as recently 
suggested in the literature, one assumes that the control by the group of a percentage equal to 
20% or more corresponds to the full control of the relative firm (La Porta-Lopez-de-Silanes-
Shleifer-Vishny 1999; Bertrand-Mullainathan 2003).
10 
In order to offer a more realistic, and, at the same time, more prudent assessment of state 
control, we have experimented with two other criteria. The third criterion, majority control, 
attributes  to  the  control  of  the  group  the  total  capital  of  a  firm  that  is  controlled  by  a 
percentage of more than 50%,
11 while it excludes the capital of a firm that is controlled with a 
percentage of equal or less than 50%. The logic of this criterion is similar to the previous one, 
but it avoids potential over-estimation. Moreover, it is appropriate to the particular features of 
the Italian ownership system. 
Finally, the fourth criterion is aimed to ascertain how relevant to the public sector is a very 
widespread model of governance of Italian private groups: the pyramidal control. In order to 
obtain this, each group was attributed the capital of the firms controlled through a chain of 
shareholdings that was greater than 50%. It is appropriate to recall that this case differs from 
the previous ones because it does not proceed with a simple algebraic calculation, as it looks 
upon situations of repeated control. The logic behind the pyramidal control enables us to 
evaluate the weight of the public groups on all Italian firms with regard to the widespread 
practice of creating chains of firms able to guarantee the total control of the underlying firms, 
thus limiting the capital directly invested by the parent company. Figure 2 should clarify the 
logic behind the pyramidal control: it shows how one unit, in this case IRI, with just one stake 
(in the holding company) can act as the ultimate owner of all the firms in the chain, including 
those in which it has not invested directly.
12 
<Figure 2> 
The methodology described above is applied to the firms which belong to the three state 
holdings registered in the Imita.db archive. However, beyond these firms, our sources enabled 
                                                 
10 In a context in which ownership is widely dispersed (for example, public companies), the control of 20% of 
the capital of a firm would guarantee that the appointment of a number of directors would be sufficient to secure 
the  actual  control  of  an  entire  firm.  However,  it  is  well-known  that  ownership  in  Italy  is  far  from  being 
dispersed. Rinaldi-Vasta (2005) and Bargigli-Vasta (2006). 
11 This kind of control has already been described in the Berle and Means’ (1932) pioneering work and is today 
often used in studies on corporate ownership. 
12 In other terms, Figure 5.2 shows how IRI, through a limited investment, can control the activities of the group 
through the majority of share capital and of voting rights of all the firms in the chain. For example, if the Z1 firm 
had a share capital equal to 100, in the case of a pyramidal structure (like that presented in Figure 3.2), financial 
commitment of IRI to control Z1 would be equal to 6.8%. In fact, IRI’s direct commitment is limited to 51% of 
the capital of the sub-holding which back to back scales down to 26%  of X1 (51% * 51%), to 13.3% of Y1 
(51% * 26%); and, finally, to 6.8% of Z1 (51% * 13.3%). In the absence of a pyramidal structure, in order to 
gain control of Z1, IRI would have had to take a shareholding equal to 51% of Z1 share capital, maintaining 
therefore  a  financial  outlay  equal  to  51  (51%  of  100,  share  capital  of  Z1),  much  greater  than  the  amount 
maintained under the hypothesis of pyramidal control (6.8).   7 
us also to identify the firms belonging to the three groups, but which are not included in the 
Imita.db. This data set in fact includes the joint stock companies with a share capital greater 
than a specified threshold (which could change from year to year)
13:  Table 1 offers some 
details on the number of Italian SOEs included in the data-base. 
<Table 1> 
On the whole, over 2,500 firms have been identified, even if those used in the following 
analysis  are  about  1,200,  which  are  the  ones  contained  in  the  Imita.db.  In  the  first  four 
benchmark years, as shown in Table 1, the percentages of the total number of recorded firms 
accounted for by Imita.db are remarkable for IRI, ENI, and, in 1971, also for EFIM. The 
representativeness decreases in 1983, when only half of the detected firms are registered by 
the Imita.db. This could be the consequence either of the changes in the capital threshold 
criteria employed to include firms in the database, as it went from 100 million lire in 1973 to 
1 billion in 1984, or of the increase in the number of controlled firms with other legal forms, 
or both.  
 
3. The structure of IRI, ENI and EFIM groups 
Figures  3a-c  show  the  disaggregation,  using  the  accounting  criterion,  by  macro  sector  in 
terms of the number of firms, share capital and assets, at the same time illustrating how the 
structure  of  the  three  state  holdings  evolves  as  time  goes  by.  Apart  from  the  number  of 
controlled  firms  and  the  percentage  of  controlled  share  capital,  the  analysis  uses  another 
proxy  (assets)  which  is  generally  reputed  as  one  of  the  most  reliable  for  measuring  the 
dimension of the firm (White 2002): in other terms, it is hypothesised that the control of the 
firm share corresponds to a similar control of its assets. In order to have a more uniform 
picture, which is less vulnerable to the occasional economic turmoil of a single benchmark 
year, our data provide the triennial averages for the following five periods: 1935-37, 1951-53, 
1959-61, 1970-72, 1981-83.
14 
With regard to the IRI group, in the first place, the substantial stability of the weight of the 
sectors emerges, albeit with a tendency to polarisation through time. In the first year, the 
structure appears quite diversified, with the presence of some agricultural firms, mining firms, 
and a steady weight of utilities. After the 1962 nationalisation of electricity, the IRI structure 
becomes less diversified. The number of manufacturing firms fluctuates around 40% of the 
total, the service firms around 25%, while financial firms increase their weight reaching as 
much as about a third of the total in 1981-1983. Clearly, either in terms of share capital or in 
terms of assets, the weight of financial firms is much higher touching almost 75% of the total. 
In contrast, in the post-war era, the manufacturing firms holds about 20% of share capital and 
15% of the assets of all the firms within the group. 
<Figure 3a-c> 
                                                 
13 Small joint stock companies and other firms with different company structures are therefore not included. 
Moreover, Italian firms with their headquarters abroad are also excluded. For further information, see Vasta 
(2006). 
14 We have considered those years which are adjacent to the benchmark ones, with the exception of 1972 and 
1983, where we had to resort to the two previous years. Imita,db contains a complete time series of the balance 
sheets until 1971, and then for the period 1980-1982. With regard to ENI, we take into consideration the biennial 
1954-55, the first one after the creation of the state holding.   8 
The structure of the ENI group is less polarised and shows less stability at sector level.
15 
Mining encompasses  a limited number of firms but always scores the highest result with 
regard to capital, even though, in terms of assets, its weight is less significant. Manufacturing 
covers a considerable share (about 40% of the group): moreover, when the other two proxies 
(share capital and assets) are considered, the manufacturing character of ENI emerges, and is 
even greater than that of IRI. This was the consequence not only of the development of the 
industrial activities connected to the core business – oil production and refining, as well as 
chemical activities – but also of the diversification both into correlated activities, such as 
pipelines (Saipem), or pumps (Nuovo Pignone), and into un-correlated ones, such as textiles 
(Lanerossi). 
The structure of the EFIM was strongly biased towards manufacturing, which accounted for 
more than two-thirds of the firms in the group. Such a group also includes quite a number of 
financial firms, but, once the share capital is considered, the situation is overturned: financial 
firms  represented  more  than  80%  of  the  total,  while,  if  we  consider  assets,  a  substantial 
balance between manufacturing and financial firms emerges. 
Furthermore  the  different  holding  share  typologies  described  above  (cf.  §  2)  have  been 
analysed: the various combinations of control can be determined for each benchmark year, 
differentiating among manufacturing firms and firms in other sectors. These data provide, at a 
first approximation, interesting information concerning the governance adopted by the three 
public groups. 
With regard to IRI, Table 2 shows the form of control changes remarkably over time.  
<Table 2> 
The  growth  of  the  group  reflected  mainly  the  development  of  the  holding  companies 
(financial  or  not).  In  1936  the  main  link  was  direct  IRI  participation  in  137  firms  (50 
manufacturing firms and 87 firms in other sectors), which were subsequently to be ascribed to 
the group. In 1952, the situation was already more fluent even though direct holding share 
was still the most common link (44 cases). Shareholding through financial companies was 
also  widespread  (19)  as  well  as  the  joint  shareholding  by  IRI  and  the  financial  holding 
companies (34). In the following years, the shareholding scheme becomes more complex: on 
the one hand, the number of firms in which IRI directly held shares decreased while the 
number of those whose share capital was controlled through financial holding-companies and 
other firms of the group increased; on the other hand, the multifaceted shareholding – direct, 
through financial holding companies and through firms at the second level – became quite 
frequent. In the period considered the group structure seemed to move towards a pyramidal 
system. In particular, from a holding with direct control over the manufacturing activities, IRI 
was transformed into an owner of the last resort controlling the financial holdings: these, in 
turn, guaranteed the control over the forward firms, both through indirect share-holding - with 
a chain that allowed the control of a firm with small investment - and through cross share-
holding. 
In the case of ENI, the forms of control are quite different, but here, too, as in IRI, they 
become more and more articulated over time. ENI’s direct presence remains scarce as firms 
are mainly controlled by the holding companies and/or by the other firms of the group. From 
                                                 
15 This latter aspect is, however, partially determined by the changing sectorial classification of some firms of the 
group, like, for example, AGIP. Imita.db, like other main datasets on firms, attributes the sectorial classification 
of a firm according to its prevailing activity. For many diversified firms, their prevailing activity could change 
over time; in this way significant percentages of share capital are moved from one sector to another.   9 
its foundation in 1953, ENI sectors of activity were clearly separated into productive and 
commercial divisions, and each one was controlled at the top by a holding company. For 
instance,  for  most  of  the  1950s  and  1960s,  there  were  four  divisions:  upstream  activities 
headed by Agip Mineraria, downstream by Agip, natural gas by Snam, chemicals by Anic. 
Then,  the  first  two  were  merged  into  Agip  but,  in  a  short  time,  the  number  of  holding 
companies began to increase (Sapelli et al. 1993). Furthermore, after 1983, the number of 
companies which held shares within the group as well as cross shares between the holding 
company and the other firms grew. 
In contrast, EFIM’s structure of control was much simpler: the state holding controlled mainly 
financial firms which, in turn, directly controlled other (mainly) manufacturing firms. EFIM 
kept direct control of almost all the financial firms and of the shares of the capital of the 
service  firms;  in  1982,  the  control  of  the  capital  of  the  manufacturing  firms  was  almost 
entirely in the hands of the financial firms of the group. 
 
4. The Boundaries 
It is well-known that the size of the Italian SOEs was by no means insignificant, however its 
internal structure was too complex to allow, in the past, a systematic quantitative estimation 
of its dimensions. Some studies (Mortara 1976; Arrighetti-Stansfield-Virno 1982; Bognetti-
Spagnolo 1992) have attempted to produce a mapping of SOEs, but only for short periods,
16 
while studies on the long-term nature of governance fail to provide a systematic analysis of 
Italian SOEs (Aganin-Volpin 2005). Furthermore, the lack of quantitative information on the 
constellation of the Italian firms has precluded any estimate of the real weight of the SOEs in 
the economic activities of the country. The results presented here provide a first step in the 
direction of both the study of the evolution of Italian capitalism, and, in a broader perspective, 
of the comprehension of the nature of the governance of the Italian firms. This, in turn, would 
allow the relationship between governance and performance, the evolution of the financial 
structure and the economic growth in general to be brought to light. 
Table 3 shows the number of companies whose shares were partly or totally controlled by the 
three groups and their weight vis-à-vis the total of Italian firms included in the Assonime 
directory. The percentage of the total of the share capital and assets controlled by the three 
groups, using the accounting criterion, is presented in Table 4, while in table 5 the same 
values will be calculated for the different segments of the manufacturing sector. 
<Tables 3-4-5> 
With regard to IRI, the overall percentages become even more significant as early as1936. 
Three years after its foundation, when IRI was still a temporary agency, its weight on the total 
capital of the Italian joint stock companies was 12.5% (Table 4)
 17. 
In the first two post war benchmark  years (1952 and 1960) – in other words, during the 
golden age – the weight of IRI rose considerably, reaching values higher than 15%. In the 
period that followed, the percentage grew further: 21.2% in 1972 and 29.9% in 1983. The 
weight of ENI also tended to increase: it was about 3% of the total in the two benchmark 
years after its foundation, but it approached values of around 8% in the last two years. The 
                                                 
16  Mortara  (1976)  refers  to  the  period  1970-74,  Arrighetti-Stanfield-Virno  (1982)  refer  to  1976-78,  while 
Bognetti-Spagnolo (1992) analyse the 1983-88 period. 
17  For a detailed disaggregation of the share capital of the manufacturing sector controlled by IRI, ENI and 
EFIM see Toninelli-Vasta (2010, table 3.5)   10 
weight of EFIM, albeit lower, was not negligible, amounting to about 2.5% of the overall 
share  capital  of  Italian  firms.  Actually  since  the  1960s  these  trends  were  affected  by  the 
State’s additions to their endowment funds, the mechanism envisaged by the government to 
offset  the  “improper  financial  burdens”  in  their  balance  sheet  (Rapporto  Saraceno  1975), 
which however increasingly exposed SOEs to political pressures. 
Therefore, when adding up the percentages of control of the three main state holdings in 
accordance with the structure indicated  above (Figure 4),  we  can observe that the values 
continue to grow considerably during the period analyzed. Their value during the golden age 
amounts to about 20% of the share capital of Italian firms. In the early 1970s, this percentage 




The disaggregated analysis at sector level shows that control by  IRI is remarkable in the 
banking and financial sector, with percentages that oscillate from 22.5% in 1936 to about 50% 
of the total capital in the period following the Second World War. It is worthy of note that the 
transport sector also grew in size such that in 1983 IRI’s weight exceeds 60% of the total 
capital of the firms (Toninelli-Vasta 2007). ENI controls a very high percentage of mining: in 
1983 it accounted for almost the entire share capital of the sector. With regard to the utilities 
sector, the values are somehow misleading: in fact, the 1972 peak (49.6% for ENI: see table 
5.4) was caused by the effects of the 1962 nationalization of electricity. A great part of the 
electrical activities was given to a new public body, Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica 
(ENEL) which was included in the Imita.db sample in 1972. However, in that year, ENEL 
had  not  yet  been  endowed  with  proper  funds  by  the  government.  As  a  consequence,  the 
overall capital values of the electrical companies was strongly undervalued.
19 
The wide impact of SOEs on the economy emerges from the aggregated data of the three 
groups:  in  a  considerable  number  of  sectors  of  primary  importance  -  mining,  financial, 
transport, utilities - the weight of SOEs is clear and their presence broadly diffused, and is, no 
matter  how  it  is  viewed,  significantly  bigger  than  indicated  by  the  fragmentary  estimates 
previously available. 
Focus will now be directed to the manufacturing sector, in order to analyze, with the help of 
Table 5, the weight of the three public groups. All three groups show a strong and growing 
specialization in manufacturing. Their total weight grew from 7.9% in 1936, to 12.3% in 
1972. Clearly, in 1936, this weight depended entirely on IRI, which was joined in the 1950s 
by ENI, and then, in the last two benchmark years, also by EFIM. Here, too, the year 1983 
registers a notable expansion: the combined weight of the three groups rises above a quarter 
of the total. The data disaggregated by sector highlight how the control of the three groups 
over the whole period was concentrated in the heavy sectors, albeit with an alternate trend. 
                                                 
18 It must be underlined, as already anticipated in footnote 4, that the representativeness of the Imita.db in the 
universe of Italian joint stock companies declines in the final benchmark year, 1983. The weight of the three 
public groups on the Imita.db and on the Italian joint stock companies almost coincides with the first four 
benchmark years, when the Imita.db represented always more than 90% of the total. Compared to the values 
presented in Table 4, in fact, the weight of the three public groups in the Italian joint stock companies is 11.5% 
in 1936, 22.1% in 1952-54, 17.9% in 1960 and 29.7% in 1972. In 1983, instead, there is a large gap: the weight 
of all three groups on the Imita.db climbs up to 40.2%, while the weight on the joint stock company universe is 
equal to 33.5%. 
19 In our analysis the endowment funds given by governments are considered equivalent to the share capital.   11 
IRI is strong in the steel industry and in the transport equipment sector. In steel, in the first 
three  benchmark  years,  the  IRI  share  oscillates  around  25%,  reaching  55.8%  in  1983;  in 
transport equipment, the share increases from 12.2% in 1936 to 37.4% in 1972, attaining 
28.3% in 1983. A significant presence can also be found in the machinery and equipment 
industry, especially in the first years, and also in the electrical equipment industry. 
ENI  is  concentrated  in  the  energy  sector,  with  a  significant  weight  in  the  oil  sector  and, 
especially in 1972 and 1983, in chemicals. In the last two years analyzed, ENI underwent a 
process  of  unexpected  diversification,  as  can  be  seen  by  looking  at  the  not  unsubstantial 
percentage in the textile industry, where ENI accounted for 8.8% of the total of capital of 
Italian firms in 1983. 
The smallest of the three state holdings, EFIM, was less specialized. Its presence, in general 
rather low, was, however, well distributed over almost all the heavy sectors and especially in 
the machinery equipment and transport equipment.. 
Following the hypothesis, advanced earlier, that the control of the capital share of the firm 
corresponds precisely to the control share of the assets,
20 a further analysis of the weight of 
the three state holdings within the Italian system of firms can be provided precisely by using 
assets. Their estimates are shown in Tables 6 and 7 which respectively concern the assets that 
were both directly and indirectly controlled by IRI, ENI and EFIM of all sectors as well as the 
manufacturing sector alone. 
<Tables 6-7> 
The weight of the three public groups in the overall economic activities (Table 6) is quite 
stable, even in comparison to what was observed above with regard to the share of capital 
(Figure 4). In the first four benchmark years, the overall weight oscillated around 20%, with a 
peak in 1981 of 26%. The weight of IRI remains stable, while ENI presents steadily growing 
values. A more precise analysis of the data is beyond the aim of this study: however, it is 
suffice to notice that, generally speaking, our results are quite different to those observed 
using share capital. For instance, the difference between the two proxies in 1972 can, at least 
partly,  be  explained  by  the  above-mentioned  anomalous  trend  of  the  capital  share  in  the 
electrical sector. Nevertheless, a few interesting aspects already emerge, such as the major 
stability of the weight of assets compared to what was observed for share capital. Moreover, 
even some sectorial differences due to specific features of SOEs can be identified. In the 
financial sector, for example, with the exception of the year 1936, when IRI was controlling 
numerous banks, the  financial firms prevailed, serving as sub-holdings for the three state 
holdings. Compared to banks and insurance firms, these companies had smaller assets, and 
thus their values under state control result as smaller in terms of assets compared to those seen 
for share capital. Other sectors, such as transport or even mining show a post World War II 
similar trend between the two proxies. The same can also be observed in the manufacturing 
sector as well as in the most of the sub-sectors of which it was composed. 
 
5. Forms of control and boundaries 
In order to assess the “real” weight of public enterprise, in Table 8 we present the three 
different models of the groups previously discussed, that is effective control, majority control 
and pyramidal control.  
                                                 
20 The Imita.db archive does not include yet the balance statements of the real estate firms nor, as a consequence, 
their assets values.   12 
As for IRI, the majority control is prevalent for all the benchmark years. Moreover, it shows 
fairly clearly that manifold minority shareholdings are quite numerous, especially in 1936. In 
the  following  years,  shareholdings  constituting  effective  control  (between  20  and  50%) 
became more numerous, except for the last benchmark year. The ENI group presents a limited 
number of small shareholdings throughout the period, but it has a considerable number of 
shareholdings that allow effective control, especially in 1952 and 1972; this, as in the case of 
IRI, was considerably reduced in the last benchmark year. The same trend is recorded for 
EFIM,  which,  in  1972,  owned  many  shareholdings  (48.4%  of  the  total)  which  allowed 
effective control. As in the other state holdings, such a percentage diminished considerably in 
1983,  thus  favoring  majority  shareholdings.  Therefore,  in  the  central  phase  of  the  period 
(corresponding to the benchmark years – 1952/4, 1960 and 1972), the three state holdings 
took charge of a significant percentage of the shareholdings that allowed them to control the 
firms without owning the majority of their share capital. The 1983 data show that, in the early 
1980s, this phenomenon was clearly reduced. 
<Table 8> 
We proceeded then to calculate their control capacity according to the previously identified 
criteria: this provides an estimate of the real weight of the public groups on the Italian joint 
stock companies. In the light of this, by adopting the accounting criterion, these estimates 
were referred to the control of share capital. We have assumed that, for all the firms with 
effective control, the whole capital could, in fact, be entirely attributed to state control. In 
Figure 5, the percentages have been calculated considering 20% to be the inferior threshold 
for effective control: this considerably broadens the boundaries of Italian SOEs in a way that 
extensively widens their dimensions. With regard to IRI, for example, it becomes evident how 
the  boundaries  of  the  IRI  group  appear  significantly  wider  than  previously  imagined.  In 
particular, for the period between 1952 and 1972, the boundaries reconstructed on the basis of 
effective control are much larger in comparison to the estimates made upon the basis of the 
accounting criterion. In the central years, at the very least, the relative weight of the share 
capital controlled by a value of between 20 and 50% might be large enough to compensate for 
the value of the share capital of the minority shareholdings that were not considered by using 
the effective control criterion. In contrast, in the case of the other two groups (ENI and EFIM), 
the increase of the effective control compared to the accounting control is minor, although, in 
terms of proportions, it, nevertheless, remains significant, as seen in Figure 5.  
In addition, we have also calculated the degree of control following the majority criterion, 
obtaining only marginal differences in comparison to the accounting values.  
Finally, the growth of the weight of the three groups when a pyramidal control criterion is 
adopted, if compared to the weight calculated following the accounting criterion, is presented 
in Figure 6. On this basis, we proceeded to sum up the entire capital of the firms controlled 
through  a  chain  of  shareholdings  above  50%.  This  means  that,  in  situations  of  repeated 
control, both direct or indirect, we did not consider the accounting capital value but the entire 
capital of that firm. The increase of the control of the firm, in this case, highlights different 
trends  for  the  three  groups.  With  regard  to  the  IRI  group,  its  boundaries  again  emerge 
significantly wider than those defined by the accounting criterion, although they are inferior 
to  those  obtained  using  the  effective  criterion.  For  the  other  two  groups,  the  pyramidal 
criterion shows the opposite trend: we can notice narrower boundaries than those resulting 
from the accounting criterion for the whole period, with the exception of ENI in the year 
1960. These results highlight the different strategies adopted by the three state holdings. On 
the one hand, IRI is characterized by a strongly pyramidal structure, with permanent indirect 
and cross shareholdings (cf. Table 2), which allowed it to control a vast number of firms. On   13 
the other, the other two state holdings show a weaker structure and a more limited (ENI), or 
even almost completely absent (EFIM), chain of control. 
<Figures 5-6> 
 
6. The regional distribution 
6.1. Number and size distribution. A further step towards the comprehension of Italian SOEs 
dynamics and contribution to the country’s economy has been done by breaking down the 
national series into disaggregate categories, representing four regional macro-areas (North-
West,  North-East,  Central,  South  and  Islands).  Each  of  them  has  been  in  turn  further 
subdivided according to the country’s administrative regional structure (that is 19 regions). 
Such  analysis  has  been  performed  with  regard,  first,  to  number  of  firms  and  assets  and, 
second, to their respective shares as compared to the IMITA universe. For this exercise we 
have preferred the data reconstructed through the effective control criteria, which is likely to 
give a better idea of the real dimension of the phenomenon.  
Before getting more deeply into the analysis a caveat has to be introduced. SOEs regional 
distribution data often involve some unavoidable bias, that is an abnormal concentration in the 
Latium region, where the capital is located: in fact in Rome not only IRI’s, ENI’s and EFIM’s 
headquarters were located, but also a fair number of holding and operating companies. Such 
disproportion does not concern so much the absolute numbers as the size of assets. In fact 
with respect to the first only in the 1952-54 benchmark, Latium shows an abnormal value: 
35.3% of the country’s total. In the other four benchmark years (1936, 1960, 1972, 1983) the 
results  (with  values  between  21.8%  and  27%)  are  not  much  different  from  Lombardy’s 
(20.0% to 25.8%. see table 9), But if we turn to the assets data, the share of the Rome region 
jumps to much higher values, with a peak in 1972 (45.1% of the total assets of Italian SOEs) 
towering over a set of values around 40%. Such region alone attracted Central Italy’s almost 
entire investment in public firms. Lombardy was still the second more concentrated region, 
even though at much lower level (between 22.8% and 27.3% of total assets).  
< Table 9 > 
In contrast to Latium, Lombardy’s position in the ranking is to be explained by the area’s high 
level  of  industrialization.  Such  a  position  in  the  public  sector  quite  contradicts  the 
conventional wisdom tending to contrast Milan, the “moral capital” and the core of the private 
capitalism, with very few public undertakings, with the political capital Rome, the core of 
state capitalism in Italy. 
Disaggregating SOEs series for macro-areas yields quite clear results. The North-West turns 
out as the region with the largest share with regard both to number and assets. Here is where 
the so called “industrial triangle” (Piedmont, Liguria and Lombardy) is located and where a 
good  part  of  the  heavy  industry  was  rescued  by  the  State  during  the  Depression  years. 
Emblematic is the case of Liguria which ranks third among the regions most affected by State 
intervention (with a 23% share in 1936)  and  where the shipbuilding  industry was deeply 
involved in the crisis of the sector which persisted throughout the war and its aftermath: not 
by accident within the North-East area, where all in all state intervention was quite feeble, 
only Friuli- Venezia Giulia stands out with a 4.5% share of public assets in 1952-4. 
Looking then at the internal dynamics of the numbers, we can note that three of the four 
macro-areas  do  not  show  a  clear  trend:  as  for  number,  North-West  is  characterized  by  a 
stationary tendency until the 1960s, followed by a decline which in reality seems to mask a 
capitalization  of  assets,  as  portrayed  by  its  U-shape  behavior;  the  North-East  shows  very   14 
irregular trends both in number and assets; the same can be said of Central Italy, even though 
with a more fluctuating behavior as far as numbers are concerned. Only the South shows a 
neat tendency to grow both in number and assets: here between 1936 and 1972 the number of 
public undertakings increases from 9 to 72, followed by a small decline in the next decade: 
this corresponds to an increase of 12 percentage points (from 10,1 to 23,1). As for assets this 
meant a growth from an almost non-existent 0,9% in 1936 to 5,0% in 1981, thus marking 
quite clearly the change of economic policy towards the South since the post-war period. ENI 
and IRI were among the main instruments through which the government tried to pursue the 
convergence of the southern regions, especially Campania and Sicily (which received the 
greatest help), towards the North. 
6.2 Public and private firms.  The trend just illustrated is reinforced by the examination of 
table 10, which measure the weight of public firms over the IMITA universe in each region. 
As a matter of fact these two tables show very clearly that both number and assets of SOEs 
not only kept growing in the South, but also grew at a faster rate than private undertakings.  
 
<Table 10> 
The share of public firms in the total number of firms registered by IMITA in the South 
increased significantly over the entire period, raising from 3.5% in 1936 to 12.2% in 1983, 
while the relative assets share grew even more (from 2.3% to 18.4%).  
Here too the two above mentioned regions (Campania and Sicily) most benefited from State 
intervention: up to 1960 they were in practice the only southern regions characterized by 
some presence of SOEs (although with values not comparable to the North-East and Latium); 
then in the following two benchmark years public undertakings gained an important role also 
in the other regions. For instance in 1971 the six SOEs registered in Basilicata represented 
almost one third of the number of the companies recorded in IMITA and to 9.1 % of the 
region total assets: in the same year SOEs’ assets reached in Apulia 16.1% of the total and in 
Abruzzo-Molise 29.3%. 
However something else comes out strongly from these two tables: it is the overwhelming 
direct presence of the State in the economic activities of Liguria and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
which confirms what was already suggested about the increasing weight of SOEs in heavy 
industry, particularly in shipbuilding, which is a capital intensive sector par excellence. In 
Liguria the share of SOEs assets fluctuated between 43.2% and 51% up to the Seventies, to 
break then the 70% level in 1981; in Friuli it peaked at 51.5 in 1952, to decrease slowly 
thereafter.  
In the end a further confirmation concerns Lombardy: in three of the five benchmark years the 
share of public assets was more than one fifth of total assets, with a peak of 27% in 1981. 
This  value,  which  was  likely  to  be  more  the  result  of  private  disinvestment  than  of  real 
expansion of the public sector, concurred with the Liguria abnormal value to push in 1981 the 
North-West percentage up to one third of the total. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The initial hypotheses of our research was that state ownership has been characterised over 
time  by  an  accentuated  variability,  which  was  determined  by  a  continuous  stream  of 
acquisitions, mergers and dismissals. Such variability, together with the scarce availability of 
quantitative information on the structure of the systems of Italian firms, prevented us form 
identifying the boundaries of Italian SOE.   15 
The results presented in this study can be summarised as follows: 
￿  The weight of the three public groups, measured by two standard proxies, such as share 
capital  and  assets  of  all  the  Italian  corporates,  is  very  significant  and  shows  growth, 
which, for some sectors (mining, transport, finance and utilities) reached quite remarkable 
percentages of the total: this is particularly true with regard to the weight that the three 
state holdings had on the manufacturing sector and especially on the heavy sectors (such 
as the steel industry, transport equipment and the oil industry). 
￿  The group structure of the three state holdings is quite complex, both with regard to the 
large number of firms distributed all over the sectors of the economy and because of the 
high level of complexity of the forms of control. This complexity increased over time, 
together with the enlargement of the boundaries of public enterprise. 
￿  The three groups show a growing tendency to polarise their activities, even though IRI 
tends to maintain a robust multi-sectorial structure. Moreover, quite a clear manufacturing 
specialisation emerged in the three groups over time. 
￿  The estimates presented – namely, the outcome of the different forms of control of the 
subordinate firms which have been hypothesised - have highlighted how public control 
can, at times, expand considerably (getting as high as 60%), when criteria different from 
the accounting one are employed. 
￿  With  regard  to  the  forms  of  control  of  the  groups,  some  significant  differences  have 
emerged.  For  example,  IRI  managed  an  increasing  number  of  shareholdings  through 
financial holding  companies, while ENI  almost always operated through non-financial 
holding  companies.  Furthermore,  IRI  directly  handled  a  considerable  amount  of 
shareholdings: in the case of ENI, this was quite unusual. 
￿  As for the regional distribution two conclusions deserve special attention here, as they 
only partly confirm the traditional picture offered by historiography. They confirm the 
growing weight of the state in the South, which seems to compensate for the insufficient 
investment  of  private  groups  and  thereby  balance,  at  least  partially,  the  original 
concentration of the state’s efforts in the northern and central regions. On the other hand, 
the research shows more innovative results with regard to the enduring presence of the 
state in the Northern areas, particularly in Lombardy, where the bulk of private initiatives 
was concentrated.  
This paper represents, therefore, a basic step towards the construction of a quantitative picture 
of  Italian  public  enterprise.  Although  it  is  only  an  initial  analysis,  this  study  has  already 
produced quite important results for the economic history of Italy, as shown, for instance, by 
Figure 4. The level of the direct state intervention in the economy reconstructed here has not 
even been approximated by previous studies: thus, this new evidence on the subject can be 
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Figure 4. Weight of share capital and assets of firms held by IRI, ENI and EFIM on Imita.db and on 
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1936  148  32  180  82.2 
1952  120  35  155  77.4 
1960  147  54  201  73.1 
1972  201  53  254  79.1 
1983  230  362  592  38.9 
Total  846  536  1,382  61.2 
ENI 
1936         
1954  28  7  35  80.0 
1960  40  11  51  78.4 
1972  63  32  95  66.3 
1983  78  95  173  45.1 
Total  209  145  354  59.0 
EFIM 
1936         
1952         
1960         
1972  62  21  83  74.7 
1983  59  47  106  55.7 
Total  121  68  189  64.0 
IRI+ENI+EFIM 
1936  148  32  180  82.2 
1952-
54  148  42  190  77.9 
1960  187  65  252  74.2 
1972  326  106  432  75.5 
1983  367  504  871  42.1 




Table 2. IRI, ENI and EFIM by typologies of shareholder(number of firms) 
 
 IRI group*  1936  1952  1960  1972  1983  
IRI direct (1)  137  44  28  16  16 
Holding companies (2)       1  4  4 
Financial holding companies (3)  6  19  42  80  94 
Other group firms (4)     18  32  64  61 
(1) + (3)  4  34  26  12  12 
(3) + (4)       10  11  27 
Other     4  7  13  15 
Total  147  119  146  200  229 
ENI group**           
ENI direct (1)     2  3  3  4 
Holding companies (2)     12  22  32  12 
Financial holding companies (3)            2 
Other group firms (4)     9  6  16  19 
(2) + (3)            12 
(2) + (4)     1  7  8  7 
Other     3  1  3  21 
Total     27  39  62  77 
EFIM group***           
EFIM direct (1)          6  8 
Financial holding companies (2)          33  50 
Other group firms (3)          22    
Total           61  58 





Table 3. The IRI, ENI and EFIM firms and their weight in Imita.db (number of firms and %) 
IMITA  IRI group + ENI group + EFIM group  Macro-sector 
1936  1952  1960  1972  1983  1936  %  1952-54  %  1960  %  1972  %  1983  % 
Agriculture and fishing   188  241  158  256  166  10  5.3  2  0.8  1  0.6  7  2.7  6  3.6 
Mining   93  127  144  161  34  6  6.5  13  10.1  16  11.1  10  6.2  4  11.8 
Manufacturing   1,764  3,017  3,163  6,140  2,911  51  2.9  58  1.9  74  2.3  168  2.7  157  5.4 
Utilities   224  169  167  77  26  9  4.0  22  13.0  27  16.2  5  6.5  11  42.3 
Construction   139  196  181  427  244  4  2.9  2  1.0  8  4.4  18  4.2  11  4.5 
Services  1,553  2,009  2,066  3,947  1,105  42  2.7  32  1.6  39  1.9  81  2.1  78  7.1 
Financial intermediation   285  422  492  795  1,100  26  9.1  19  4.5  22  4.5  37  4.7  100  9.1 
Total  4,246  6,181  6,371  11,803  5,586  148  3.5  148  2.4  187  2.9  326  2.8  367  6.6  
28 
 
Table 4. Weight of share capital of firms held by IRI, ENI and EFIM (% of Imita.db, total) 
IRI group  ENI group  EFIM group  total  Macro-sector 
1936  1952  1960  1972  1983  1936  1954  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952-54  1960  1972  1983 
Agriculture and fishing   27.3  16.9  0.6  4.0  0.4    -  -  -  0.4        -  0.3  27.3  16.9  0.6  4.0  1.2 
Mining   2.7  5.0  0.8  0.5  -    65.4  42.1  86.7  94.8        0.0  0.0  2.7  70.3  43.0  87.3  94.9 
Manufacturing   7.9  7.4  8.5  7.1  18.9    1.6  2.6  4.4  6.8        0.8  1.3  7.9  9.0  11.1  12.3  27.1 
Utilities   6.7  8.6  7.5  1.0  0.0    2.9  1.3  49.6  2.9        -  -  6.7  11.6  8.8  50.5  2.9 
Construction   5.8  5.5  1.7  5.0  7.3    -  0.8  0.5  0.4        0.1  0.0  5.8  5.5  2.5  5.7  7.7 
Services   19.9  17.9  18.2  13.6  29.6    0.0  0.7  0.1  7.9        0.2  0.2  19.9  17.9  19.0  13.9  37.8 
of which transport   40.9  30.5  33.3  27.4  61.4    -  1.4  0.1  0.4        -  0.4  40.9  30.5  34.7  27.5  62.2 
Financial intermediation   22.5  56.0  44.3  50.5  55.2    -  0.3  0.4  0.7        6.2  5.6  22.5  56.0  44.6  57.1  61.5 
Total  12.5  19.4  16.0  21.2  29.9    3.3  2.5  8.6  7.7        2.3  2.6  12.5  22.7  18.5  32.1  40.2 
 
Table 5.Weight of share capital of firms held by IRI, ENI and EFIM in manufacturing (% of Imita.db, manufacturing) 
IRI group  ENI group  EFIM group  total 
Sector  1936  1952  1960  1972  1983  1936  1954  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952-
54 
1960  1972  1983 
Food products and tobacco   0.2  0.1  0.0  1.2  8.2    -  -  -  -        1.0  1.4  0.2  0.1  0.0  2.2  9.7 
Textiles and textile products   3.9  -  3.2  -  -    -  -  4.2  8.8        0.1  -  3.9  -  3.2  4.2  8.8 
Leather and leather products   -  -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -        -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Wood and wood products   -  -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -        -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Paper products, publishing and printing   0.9  3.8  3.7  1.7  9.5    -  0.2  0.2  -        0.2  -  0.9  3.8  3.9  2.0  9.5 
Coke and petroleum products   0.4  0.1  0.1  -  -    13.6  10.5  16.6  44.9        -  -  0.4  13.8  10.6  16.6  44.9 
Chemicals and chemical products   6.6  3.6  2.0  1.1  0.0    0.4  6.5  10.0  23.5        0.3  0.1  6.6  4.0  8.5  11.4  23.6 
Rubber and plastic products   -  -  -  -  -    -  -  0.0  -        1.3  0.7  -  -  -  1.4  0.7 
Other non-metallic products   2.0  2.4  2.5  1.7  2.4    -  -  2.7  0.2        0.5  1.7  2.0  2.4  2.5  5.0  4.3 
Basic metals and metal products   26.8  25.9  26.2  18.0  55.8    -  -  -  0.4        1.4  1.0  26.8  25.9  26.2  19.4  57.2 
Machinery and equipment   38.1  20.3  5.5  4.5  6.4    -  3.5  1.7  4.4        1.2  2.1  38.1  20.3  9.0  7.4  12.9 
Electrical and optical equipment   1.7  11.3  9.9  9.4  13.6    -  -  -  0.3        0.9  0.8  1.7  11.3  9.9  10.3  14.7 
Transport equipment   12.2  13.0  17.9  37.4  28.3    -  -  -  -        2.6  4.9  12.2  13.0  17.9  40.0  33.3 
Manufacturing n.e.c.   0.0  -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -        -  -  0.0  -  -  -  - 




Table 6. Weight of assets of firms held by IRI, ENI and EFIM on Imita.db (all sectors) 
IRI group  ENI group  EFIM group  total  Macro-sector 
1936  1952  1960  1971  1981  1936  1954  1960  1971  1981  1936  1952  1960  1971  1981  1936  1952-54  1960  1971  1981 
Agriculture and fishing  33.0  16.2  3.3  6.9  0.8    -  -  -  0.3        -  0.3  33.0  16.2  3.3  6.9  1.5 
Mining  5.1  4.4  1.6  0.9  -    31.7  57.5  76.5  92.7        -  0.1  5.1  36.1  59.1  77.5  92.8 
Manufacturing  9.3  11.5  9.0  8.4  15.5    1.4  1.9  5.3  10.2        0.7  2.1  9.3  12.9  10.9  14.4  27.7 
Utilities  9.4  8.8  6.9  0.1  0.1    3.1  4.6  8.3  15.7        -  -  9.4  11.9  11.5  8.4  15.8 
Construction  26.0  4.3  5.7  8.9  10.9    -  2.2  0.4  0.6        0.1  0.2  26.0  4.3  7.9  9.4  11.6 
Services  8.6  29.9  30.5  29.3  39.8    -  0.1  0.1  8.1        0.0  0.2  8.6  29.9  30.5  29.4  48.1 
of which transport  17.5  39.8  40.8  39.1  63.2    -  0.0  0.1  0.1        -  0.2  17.5  39.8  40.9  39.2  63.6 
Financial intermediation  29.5  21.3  22.3  21.2  21.9    -  0.2  0.6  0.4        0.3  0.6  29.5  21.3  22.5  22.0  22.9 
Total  20.1  17.2  17.0  16.9  20.9    1.2  2.1  3.2  4.4        0.4  0.8  20.1  18.5  19.0  20.4  26.1 
 
Table 7. Weight of assets of firms held by IRI, ENI and EFIM on Imita.db (manufacturing) 
IRI group  ENI group  EFIM group  total 
Sector 
1936  1952  1960  1971  1981  1936  1954  1960  1971  1981  1936  1952  1960  1971  1981  1936  1952-54  1960  1971  1981 
Food products and tobacco  0.4  0.0  0.0  1.5  6.2    -  -  -  -        0.3  2.2  0.4  0.0  0.0  1.8  8.4 
Textiles and textile products  4.0  -  3.2  -  -    -  -  5.1  8.4        0.0  -  4.0  -  3.2  5.2  8.4 
Leather and leather products  -  -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -        -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Wood and wood products  -  -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -        -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Paper products, publishing and printing  0.7  3.8  2.9  1.8  4.2    -  0.1  0.1  -        1.5  0.2  0.7  3.8  3.1  3.4  4.4 
Coke and petroleum products  0.2  -  0.2  -  -    15.2  14.2  25.1  54.0        -  -  0.2  15.2  14.4  25.1  54.0 
Chemicals and chemical products  6.3  3.1  2.2  1.5  0.0    0.6  3.1  10.2  12.7        0.3  0.1  6.3  3.7  5.4  12.0  12.9 
Rubber and plastic products  -  -  -  -  -    -  -  0.2  0.5        1.1  0.4  -  -  -  1.3  0.9 
Other non-metallic products  1.6  2.4  2.0  2.9  3.7    -  -  1.1  0.4        1.4  2.1  1.6  2.4  2.0  5.4  6.1 
Basic metals and metal products  26.4  32.9  28.0  24.6  50.0    -  -  -  0.1        1.1  2.1  26.4  32.9  28.0  25.7  52.2 
Machinery and equipment  44.9  20.3  7.0  6.5  8.3    -  3.5  4.0  10.5        0.8  5.4  44.9  20.3  10.5  11.3  24.3 
Electrical and optical equipment  1.5  10.2  7.4  7.3  20.8    -  -  0.6  0.2        0.7  0.2  1.5  10.2  7.4  8.7  21.2 
Transport equipment  13.9  23.0  18.2  23.3  29.2    -  -  -  -        1.6  6.9  13.9  23.0  18.2  24.8  36.1 
Manufacturing n.e.c.  0.0  -  -  -  -    -  -  -  -        -  -  0.0  -  -  -  - 









Table 8 Kind of shareholding of IRI, ENI and EFIM (% number) 
 
1936  1952-54  1960  1972  1983  State holding 
<20  20≤p≤50  >50  <20  20≤p≤50  >50  <20  20≤p≤50  >50  <20  20≤p≤50  >50  <20  20≤p≤50  >50 
IRI  39.9  9.5  50.7  11.7  30.0  58.3  12.9  29.9  57.1  12.9  29.9  57.2  20.4  12.2  67.4 
ENI        3.6  46.4  50.0  7.5  22.5  70.0  12.7  36.5  50.8  6.4  9.0  84.6 
EFIM                    4.8  48.4  46.8  5.1  27.1  67.8 

































Table 9: Regional distribution of SOEs (number, number % and assets %) 
NUMBER  NUMBER %  ASSETS % 
Regions  1936  1952-54  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952-54  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952-4  1960  1971  1981 
Aosta Valley        1  1  -  -  -  0,3  0,3  -  -  -  0,0  0,0 
Piedmont  7  8  10  12  19  7,9  6,0  6,1  4,1  6,1  5,8  5,6  5,0  3,9  7,7 
Liguria  8  14  21  29  23  9,0  10,5  12,7  10,0  7,4  23,0  20,0  18,0  17,9  20,9 
Lombardy  23  34  39  58  70  25,8  25,6  23,6  20,0  22,4  27,3  22,8  25,6  25,3  24,7 
North-West  38  56  70  100  113  42,7  42,1  42,4  34,5  36,2  56,1  48,4  48,6  47,2  53,2 
Trentino Alto Adige        1  1  -  -  -  0,3  0,3  -  -  -  -  0,0 
Veneto  5  2  4  8  14  5,6  1,5  2,4  2,8  4,5  0,5  1,3  1,5  0,3  0,7 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  7  5  5  10  11  7,9  3,8  3,0  3,4  3,5  0,1  4,5  2,6  1,6  1,3 
Emilia Romagna  4  1  4  3  8  4,5  0,8  2,4  1,0  2,6  0,6  0,6  0,8  0,0  0,2 
North-East  16  8  13  22  34  18,0  6,0  7,9  7,6  10,9  1,2  6,4  4,8  2,0  2,2 
Marche        2  2  -  -  -  0,7  0,6  -  -  -  0,0  0,0 
Tuscany  2  3  6  9  18  2,2  2,3  3,6  3,1  5,8  0,2  0,2  1,8  0,7  1,7 
Umbria        2  5  -  -  -  0,7  1,6  -  -  -  0,1  0,1 
Latium  24  47  42  78  68  27,0  35,3  25,5  26,9  21,8  41,6  41,0  40,5  45,1  37,8 
Central  26  50  48  91  93  29,2  37,6  29,1  31,4  29,8  41,8  41,2  42,2  45,9  39,6 
Campania  7  13  25  34  33  7,9  9,8  15,2  11,7  10,6  0,7  3,9  4,2  2,2  3,1 
Abruzzo-Molise        1  3  -  -  -  0,3  1,0  -  -  -  0,1  0,1 
Apulia        16  10  -  -  -  5,5  3,2  -  -  -  0,3  0,2 
Basilicata        6  3  -  -  -  2,1  1,0  -  -  -  0,0  0,0 
Calabria        3  2  -  -  -  1,0  0,6  -  -  -  0,0  0,0 
Sardinia    1  1  7  8  -  0,8  0,6  2,4  2,6  -  0,0  0,0  0,3  0,3 
Sicily  2  5  8  10  13  2,2  3,8  4,8  3,4  4,2  0,2  0,0  0,1  1,9  1,3 
South  9  19  34  77  72  10,1  14,3  20,6  26,6  23,1  0,9  4,0  4,3  4,9  5,0 




Table 10: Regional distribution: Public firms as % of IMITA.db (number and assets)  
 
  SOEs as % of IMITA. (number)  SOEs as % of IMITA (assets) 
  1936  1952-54  1960  1972  1983  1936  1952-54  1960  1971  1981 
Aosta Valley               -                    -                  -               3,0              5,0                  -                  -                  -            10,0             11,5  
Piedmont              1,5               1,2               1,5               1,0              3,1            12,1             10,8               9,0              8,8             18,1  
Liguria              2,2               3,4               5,8               6,4            14,3            45,2             43,5             43,2            51,0             73,1  
Lombardy              1,2               1,2               1,4               1,3              3,6            20,7             15,1             15,8            20,3             27,0  
North-West              1,4               1,4               1,8               1,6              4,1            24,3             19,6             18,8            23,0             32,7  
Trentino Alto Adige                  -                   -                  -               0,4              1,0                  -                  -                  -                  -              0,9  
Veneto              2,5               0,7               1,4               1,1              2,8              3,0               8,0               9,5              4,2               7,9  
Friuli Venezia Giulia              6,8               3,5               3,5               3,1              7,3              0,8             51,5             42,5            28,8             32,0  
Emilia Romagna              2,8               0,5               1,6               0,4              1,4              8,5               8,4             10,1              0,4               2,1  
North-East              3,4               1,1               1,7               1,1              2,6              2,9             19,1             15,6              8,2               8,8  
Marche                  -                   -                  -               2,7              3,4                  -                  -                  -              2,9               1,3  
Tuscany              1,1               1,0               2,7               2,2              6,6              0,8               1,1             10,7              5,9             11,8  
Umbria                  -                   -                  -               4,8              6,2                  -                  -                  -            22,8             10,9  
Latium              4,0               5,9               5,5               6,4            13,1            23,9             20,0             22,7            21,0             22,7  
Central              3,3               4,5               4,7               5,2            10,0            21,3             18,5             21,6            20,2             21,7  
Campania              4,9               7,5             11,1               8,2            19,0              2,9             13,7             17,2            14,4             23,2  
Abruzzo-Molise                  -                   -                  -               1,4              5,9                  -                  -                  -            29,3             10,7  
Apulia                  -                   -                  -             10,1            14,9                  -                  -                  -            16,1             13,5  
Basilicata                  -                   -                  -             30,0            17,6                  -                  -                  -              9,1               9,1  
Calabria                  -                   -                  -               5,7            10,0                  -                  -                  -              4,5               3,7  
Sardinia               3,7              2,7       .       2,2              1,6              7,3              1,3              0,2               0,5            11,1            14,0 
Sicily                          3,6               1,7              1,9            11,8                 -              1,5               2,0              7,1             18,2  
South              3,5               4,0               4,6               4,5            12,2              2,3               8,5               9,2            12,2             18,4  
Total              2,1               2,2               2,6               2,5              5,6            19,7             18,2             18,8            20,1             25,2   
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STET Società torinese esercizi telefonici 
FINMARE Società finanziaria marittima (only for 1936 and 1937) 
FINSIDER Società finanziaria siderurgica (only for 1937) 
 
1951-1953 
STET Società torinese esercizi telefonici 
FINMARE Società finanziaria marittima 
FINSIDER Società finanziaria siderurgica 
FINMECCANICA Società finanziaria meccanica  
FINELETTRICA Finanziaria elettrica nazionale (only for 1952 and 1953) 
 
1959-1961 
STET Società torinese esercizi telefonici 
FINMARE Società finanziaria marittima 
FINSIDER Società finanziaria siderurgica 
FINMECCANICA Società finanziaria meccanica 
FINELETTRICA Finanziaria elettrica nazionale 
FINCANTIERI Finanziaria cantieri navali (only for 1960 and 1961) 
AUTOSTRADE Concessioni e Costruzioni Autostrade (only for 1960 and 1961) 
 
1970-1972 
STET Società finanziaria telefonica 
FINMARE Società finanziaria marittima 
FINSIDER Società finanziaria siderurgica 
FINMECCANICA Società finanziaria meccanica 
FINCANTIERI Finanziaria cantieri navali 
ITALSTAT Società italiana per le infrastrutture e l’assetto del territorio 
SPA Società finanziaria di partecipazioni azionarie  
Società finanziaria per il traforo del Monte Bianco (only for 1970) 
RAI Radiotelevisione italiana 
ALITALIA Linee aeree italiane  
AUTOSTRADE Concessioni e Costruzioni Autostrade (only for 1972) 
 
1981-1983 
STET Società finanziaria telefonica 
FINMARE Società finanziaria marittima 
FINSIDER Società finanziaria siderurgica 
FINMECCANICA Società finanziaria meccanica 
FINCANTIERI Finanziaria cantieri navali 
ITALSTAT Società italiana per le infrastrutture e l’assetto del territorio 
SOFIN  Società  finanziaria  di  partecipazioni  azionarie  (già  SPA  Società  finanziaria  di  partecipazioni 
azionarie) 
CREDITO ITALIANO 
BANCO DI ROMA  
BANCA COMMERCIALE ITALIANA  
BANCO DI SANTO SPIRITO 
SME Società meridionale finanziaria 
FINSIEL Finanziaria per i sistemi informativi elettronici  
ALITALIA Linee aeree italiane  
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SISMA Società industrie siderurgiche meccaniche e affini (only for 1981) 





AGIP Azienda generale italiana petroli  
ANIC Azienda nazionale idrogenazione combustibili  
SNAM Società nazionale metanodotti  
AGIP MINERARIA  
ROMSA Raffineria di oli minerali  
 
1959-1961 
AGIP Azienda generale italiana petroli 
ANIC Azienda nazionale idrogenazione combustibili 




AGIP Azienda generale italiana petroli 
ANIC Azienda nazionale idrogenazione combustibili 
SNAM Società nazionale metanodotti 
AGIP NUCLEARE (only for 1972) 
 
1981-1983 
AGIP Azienda generale italiana petroli 
ANIC Azienda nazionale idrogenazione combustibili (only for 1981 and 1982) 
SNAM Società nazionale metanodotti 
AGIP CARBONE (only for 1981 and 1982) 
SNAM PROGETTI  
LANEROSSI 
NUOVO PIGNONE Industrie meccaniche e fonderia  
OFFICINE SAVIO  
SAIPEM  
INDENI Società per la promozione di nuove iniziative industriali 
SOFID Società finanziamenti idrocarburi  
HYDROCARBONS INTERNATIONAL HOLDING S.A. 
AGIP NUCLEARE (only for 1982) 
ENICHIMICA (only for 1982 and 1983) 





FINANZIARIA ERNESTO BREDA  





FINANZIARIA ERNESTO BREDA 
AVIOFER BREDA  
MCS 
SOPAL Società partecipazioni alimentari 